Piotr Faliszewski

  • AGH University of Science and Technology
  • Wydzial Informatyki, Instytut Informatyki
  • Office: 3.33 (D-17)
  • Phone: (+48) 12 328-33-34
  • Email: faliszew@agh.edu.pl

Introduction

My research focus is on the following fields: computational social choice; preference aggregation; complexity of elections; algorithms and complexity. I am particularly interested in ideas, concepts, and research spanning and linking all these areas. I also enjoy structural complexity theory work and I pursue this direction of study as well.

Current Service

  • Member of the RDN (Poland's Council for Research Excellence)
  • I serve on the editorial board of the Artificial Intelligence journal
  • I serve on the editorial board of the Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
  • I serve on the editorial board of the journal Computer Science.

Selected Past Service

  • Program co-chair of AAMAS-2022
  • I served on the editorial board of the Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (finished by two terms).
  • Tutorial co-chair at AAMAS-2019.
  • Co-organizer of Dagstuhl Seminar 17261 (Voting: Beyond Simple Majorities and Single-Winner Elections), together with Dorothea Baumeister, Annick Laruelle, and Toby Walsh.
  • I was the PC chair of MFCS-2016 (together with Anca Muscholl and Rolf Niedermeier)
  • I was a PC chair of COMSOC-2012 (together with Felix Brandt).
  • I was a member of the COMSOC streering committee (2012--2015).
  • I got an award for a distinguished SPC of IJCAI-2019

Postdocs

  1. Andrzej Kaczmarczyk
  2. Grzegorz Lisowski
  3. Krzysztof Sornat

PhD Students

  1. mgr inz. Lukasz Janeczko
  2. mgr Stanisław Szufa (defense: May 13th, 2024)
  3. dr Grzegorz Gawron (defense: March 7th, 2023)
  4. dr inz. Krzysztof Magiera (defense: June 23rd, 2021)
  5. dr Marcin Waniek (defense: June 29th, 2017; best dissertation award from PSSI--Polish Association for Artificial Intelligence)
  6. dr Piotr Skowron [thesis] (defense: April 2nd, 2015; runner up for the 2015 IFAAMAS Victor Lesser Distinguished Dissertation Award)

MSc Students

  1. mgr inz. Krzysztof Wojtas (MSc defense Dec. 7th, 2011)
  2. mgr inz. Łukasz Gieroń (MSc defense Jul. 12th, 2012)
  3. mgr inz. Tomasz Perek (MSc defense Oct. 29th, 2012)
  4. mgr inz. Tomasz Miąsko (MSc defense Sep. 30th, 2013)
  5. mgr inz. Szymon Gut (MSc defense, June 24th, 2015)
  6. mgr inz. Adam Furmanek (MSc defense Jul. 22th, 2015)
  7. mgr inz. Tomasz Put (MSc defense Sep. 30th, 2015)
  8. mgr inz. Andrzej Kaczmarczyk (MSc defense Dec. 15th, 2015)
  9. mgr inz. Marcin Lis (MSc defense Apr. 4th, 2016)
  10. mgr inz. Piotr Szmigielski (MSc defense Sep. 28th, 2016)
  11. mgr inz. Aleksander Ksiazek (MSc defense Sep. 28th, 2016)
  12. mgr inz. Michal Mrowczyk (MSc defense, Oct. 26th, 2017)
  13. mgr inz. Michał Furdyna (MSc defense, Sep. 12th, 2018)
  14. mgr inz. Anna Kolonko (MSc defense, June 28th, 2019)
  15. mgr inz. Maciej Kocot (MSc defense, June 28th, 2019)
  16. mgr inz. Piotr Ociepka (MSc defense, September 27th, 2019)
  17. mgr inz. Jakub Stępak (MSc defense, September 27th, 2019)
  18. mgr inz. Jakub Piekarz (MSc defense, September 27th, 2019)
  19. mgr inz. Marek Powroznik (MSc defense, September 27th, 2019)
  20. mgr inz. Lukasz Janeczko (MSc defense, July 12th, 2021)
  21. mgr inz. Jan Sznajd (MSc defense, July 12th, 2021)
  22. mgr inz. Bartosz Kusek (MSc defense, September 24th, 2021)
  23. mgr inz. Kasper Sapala (MSc defense, July 15th, 2022)
  24. Mateusz Sluszniak
  25. Jan Izydorczyk
  26. Filip Nikolow
  27. Marcin Zlakowski

Publications

See also my CV, my DBLP record, and my Google Citations.

Survey Papers and Bookchapters

  1. Social Choice 2.0 and Customized Multiwinner Voting, P. Faliszewski, In J.-F. Laslier, H. Moulin, R. Sanver, W.S. Zwicker, editors, The Future of Economic Design, 2019.
    [chapter]

  2. Multiwinner Voting: A New Challenge for Social Choice Theory, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, In U. Endriss, editor, Trends in Computational Social Choice, 2017.
    [chapter] [book]

  3. Committee Scoring Rules: A Call to Arms, P. Faliszewski, IJCAI-2017 (Early Career Spotlights).
    [IJCAI]

  4. How to Choose a Committee Based on Agents' Preferences, P. Faliszewski, BESC-2017 (invited presentation).
    [BESC]

  5. Noncooperative Game Theory, P. Faliszewski, I. Rothe, J. Rothe. In J. Rothe, editor, Economics and Computation, Chapter 2. Springer, 2016.
    [book]

  6. Control and Bribery in Voting, P. Faliszewski, J. Rothe. In F. Brandt, V. Conitzer, U. Endriss, J. Lang, and A. D. Procaccia, editors, Handbook of Computational Social Choice, Chapter 7. Cambridge University Press, 2016.
    [book]

  7. Parameterization in Computational Social Choice, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, In M-Y. Kao, editor, Encyclopedia of Algorithms, Springer, 2015.
    [encyclopedia]

  8. Parameterized Algorithmics for Computational Social Choice: Nine Research Challenges, R. Bredereck, J. Chen, P. Faliszewski, J. Guo, R. Niedermeier, G. Woeginger, Tsinghua Science and Technology, Vol. 19(4), pp. 358--373, August 2014. Also available as arXiv technical report arXiv:1407.2143.
    [TST] [arXiv]

  9. Using Complexity to Protect Elections, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, Communications of the ACM, Vol. 53/11, pp. 74--82, November 2010.
    [CACM]

  10. AI's War on Manipulation: Are We Winning?, P. Faliszewski, A. Procaccia, AI Magazine, Vol. 31/4, pp. 53--64, December 2010.
    [AI Mag] [TR]

  11. A Richer Understanding of the Complexity of Election Systems, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L.A. Hemaspaandra, and J. Rothe, in Fundamental Problems in Computing: Essays in Honor of Professor Daniel J. Rosenkrantz , eds. S. Ravi and S. Shukla, pp. 375--406, Springer, 2009. Also available as URCS TR-903
    [book] [arXiv]

Research Papers

  1. The Complexity of Subelection Isomorphism Problems, P. Faliszewski, K. Sornat, S. Szufa, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, accepted. Early version presented at AAAI-2022. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [JAIR] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  2. The Price of Justified Representation, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Igarashi, P. Manurangsi, U. Schmidt-Kraepelin, W. Suksompong, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, accepted. Early version presented at AAAI-2022. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [TEAC] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  3. Guide to Numerical Experiments on Elections in Computational Social Choice, N. Boehmer, P. Faliszewski, L. Janeczko, A. Kaczmarczyk, G. Lisowski, G. Pierczynski, S. Rey, D. Stolicki, S. Szufa, T. Was, IJCAI-2024. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  4. Evaluation of Project Performance in Participatory Budgeting, N. Boehmer, P. Faliszewski, L. Janeczko, D. Peters, G. Pierczynski, S. Schierreich, P. Skowron, S. Szufa, IJCAI-2024. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  5. Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting, P. Faliszewski, L. Janeczko, A. Kaczmarczyk, G. Lisowski, P. Skowron, S. Szufa, AAMAS-2024. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [AAMAS] [arXiv]

  6. Selecting Representative Bodies: An Axiomatic View, M. Revel, N. Boehmer, R. Colley, M. Brill, P. Faliszewski, E. Elkind, AAMAS-2024. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [AAMAS] [arXiv]

  7. Robustness of Participatory Budgeting Outcomes: Complexity and Experiments, N. Boehmer, P. Faliszewski, L. Janeczko, A. Kaczmarczyk, SAGT-2023. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [SAGT] [arXiv]

  8. Justifying Groups in Multiwinner Approval Voting, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Igarashi, P. Manurangsi, U. Schmidt-Kraepelin, W. Suksompong, Theoretical Computer Sciecne, Vol. 969, 114039. Extended abstract of this paper was presented at SAGT-2022. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [TCS] [SAGT] [arXiv]

  9. Properties of the Mallows Model Depending on the Number of Alternatives: A Warning for an Experimentalist, N. Boehmer, P. Faliszewski, S. Kraiczy, ICML-2023. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [ICML] [arXiv]

  10. Participatory Budgeting: Data, Tools and Analysis, P. Faliszewski, J. Flis, D. Peters, G. Pierczynski, P. Skowron, D. Stolicki, S. Szufa, N. Talmon, IJCAI-2023. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  11. An Experimental Comparison of Multiwinner Voting Rules on Approval Elections, P. Faliszewski, M. Lackner, K. Sornat, S. Szufa, IJCAI-2023. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  12. Ties in Multiwinner Approval Voting, L. Janeczko, P. Faliszewski, IJCAI-2023. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  13. Diversity, Agreement, and Polarization in Elections P. Faliszewski, A. Kaczmarczyk, K. Sornat, S. Szufa, T. Was, IJCAI-2023. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  14. Bribery Can Get Harder in Structured Multiwinner Approval Election, B. Kusek, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, A. Kaczmarczyk, D. Knop, AAMAS-2023, accepted. Earlier version (by the first three authors and with fewer results) is available on arXiv.
    [AAMAS] [arXiv]

  15. Properties of Position Matrices and Their Elections, N. Boehmer, J.-Y. Cai, P. Faliszewski, A. Fan, L. Janeczko, A. Kaczmarczyk, T. Was, AAAI-2023. Technical report available at arXiv.
    [AAAI] [arXiv]

  16. Expected Frequency Matrices of Elections: Computation, Geometry, and Preference Learning, N. Boehmer, R. Bredereck, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, S. Szufa, NeurIPS-2022. Technical report available at arXiv.
    [NeurIPS] [arXiv]

  17. The Complexity of Proportionality Degree in Committee Elections, L. Janeczko, P. Faliszewski, AAAI-2022, Technical report available on arXiv.
    [AAAI] [arXiv]

  18. Understanding Distance Measures Among Elections, N. Boehmer, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, S. Szufa, T. Was, IJCAI-2022. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  19. How to Sample Approval Elections?, S. Szufa, P. Faliszewski, L. Janeczko, M. Lackner, A. Slinko, K. Sornat, N. Talmon, IJCAI-2022. Technical report available on arXiv.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  20. A Quantitative and Qualitative Analysis of the Robustness of (Real-World) Election Winners>, N. Boehmer, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, EAAMO-2022.
    [EAAMO]

  21. Robustness of Greedy Approval Rules, P. Faliszewski, G. Gawron, B. Kusek, EUMAS-2022. Technical report also available at arXiv.
    [EUMAS] [arXiv]

  22. Using Multiwinner Voting to Search for Movies, G. Gawron, P. Faliszewski, EUMAS-2022. Earlier version presented at 3rd Games, Agents, and Incentives Workshop (GAIW-2021).
    [EUMAS] [GAIW]

  23. The Complexity of Election Problems with Group-Separable Preferences P. Faliszewski, A. Karpov, S. Obraztsova, Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Vol. 36(1), Article 18, 2022. Early version was presented at IJCAI-2020.
    [JAAMAS] [IJCAI]

  24. Putting a Compass on the Map of Elections N. Boehmer, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, S. Szufa, IJCAI-2021, accepted. The paper was also presented at COMSOC-2021 (and got a best talk prize!).
    [IJCAI] [COMSOC] [arXiv]

  25. Winner Robustness via Swap- and Shift-Bribery: Parameterized Counting Complexity and Experiments, N. Boehmer, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, IJCAI-2021, accepted. The paper was also accepted for COMSOC-2021.
    [IJCAI] [COMSOC]

  26. Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery, P. Faliszewski, P. Manurangsi, K. Sornat, Artificial Intelligence, accepted. Preliminary version available on arXiv. Extended abstract presented at AAAI-2019.
    [AIJ] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  27. Complexity of Shift Bribery in Committee Elections, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, N. Talmon, ACM Transactions on Computation Theory, accepted. Preliminary version was presented at AAAI-16. Technical report available at arXiv.
    [TOCT] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  28. An Analysis of Approval-Based Committee Rules for 2D-Euclidean Elections, M. Godziszewski, P. Batko, P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, AAAI-21
    [AAAI]

  29. Robustness Among Multiwinner Voting Rules, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, A. Kaczmarczyk, R. Niedermeier, P. Skowron, N. Talmon, Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 290, pp. 103403, 2021. ArXiv technical report 1707.01417. Early version presented at SAGT-2017.
    [AIJ] [SAGT] [arXiv]

  30. Mixed Integer Programming with Convex/Concave Constraints: Fixed-Parameter Tractability and Applications to Multicovering and Voting, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, P. Skowron and N. Talmon, Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 814, pp. 86--105, 2020. ArXiv technical report 1709.02850. Early version presented at ADT-2015 under title Elections with Few Candidates: Prices, Weights, and Covering Problems.
    [TCS] [arXiv] [ADT]

  31. Strategic Campaign Management in Apportionment Elections R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, M. Furdyna, A. Kaczmarczyk, M. Lackner, IJCAI-2020,
    [IJCAI]

  32. Drawing a Map of Elections in the Space of Statistical Cultures, S. Szufa, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, AAMAS-2020.
    [AAMAS]

  33. Algorithms for Swap and Shift Bribery in Structured Elections, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, S. Gupta, S. Roy, AAMAS-2020.
    [AAMAS]

  34. Multiwinner Rules with Variable Number of Winners, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, ECAI-2020, accepted. ArXiv technical report 1711.06641 with title "The Complexity of Multiwinner Voting Rules with Variable Number of Winners".
    [ECAI] [arXiv]

  35. Parameterized Algorithms for Finding a Collective Set of Items, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, A. Kaczmarczyk, D. Knop, R. Niedermeier, AAAI-2020, accepted.
    [AAAI]

  36. On Swap Convexity of Voting Rules, S. Obraztsova, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, AAAI-2020, accepted.
    [AAAI]

  37. A Characterization of the Single-Peaked Single-Crossing Domain, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 54(1), pp. 167--187, 2020. Extended abstract was presented at AAAI-2014.
    [SCW] [AAAI]

  38. Recognizing Top-Monotonic Preference Profiles in Polynomial Time, K. Magiera, P. Faliszewski, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol. 66, pp. 57--84, 2019. Extended abstract appeared at IJCAI-2017.
    [JAIR] [IJCAI]

  39. Robustness of Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules, G. Gawron, P. Faliszewski, ADT-19.
    [ADT]

  40. The Complexity of Elections with Rational Actors, P. Faliszewski, M. Slavkovik, ADT-19.
    [ADT]

  41. Multigoal Committee Selection, M. Kocot, A. Kolonko, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, N. Talmon, IJCAI-19.
    [IJCAI]

  42. An Experimental View on Committees Providing Justified Representation, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, A. Kaczmarczyk, R. Niedermeier, IJCAI-19.
    [IJCAI]

  43. Algorithms for Destructive Shift Bribery, A. Kaczmarczyk, P. Faliszewski, Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Vol. 33(3), pp. 275--297, May 2019. Extended abstract presented at AAMAS-16. Full version available as arXiv technical report.
    [JAAMAS] [AAMAS] [arXiv]

  44. Axiomatic Characterization of Committee Scoring Rules, P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 180, pp. 244--273, 2019. A complete version appears as arXiv technical report. Extended abstract presented at COMSOC-16.
    [JET] [COMSOC] [arXiv]

  45. Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Characterization and Hierarchy, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation, Vol. 7(1), Article 3, January 2019. Extended abstract presented at IJCAI-16 with title "Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy". .
    [TEAC] [arXiv] [IJCAI]

  46. Proportional Representation in Elections: STV vs PAV, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, S. Szufa, N. Talmon, AAMAS-19, extended abstract (poster).
    [AAMAS]

  47. Approximation Algorithms for BalancedCC Multiwinner Rules, M. Brill, P. Faliszewski, F. Sommer, N. Talmon, AAMAS-19. Nominated for the AAMAS-2019 best paper award.
    [AAMAS]

  48. A Framework for Approval-based Budgeting Methods, P. Faliszewski, N. Talmon, AAAI-2019.
    [AAAI]

  49. How Similar Are Two Elections?, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, S. Szufa, N. Talmon, AAAI-2019.
    [AAAI]

  50. Multiwinner Analogues of the Plurality Rule: Axiomatic and Algorithmic Views, P. Faliszewski, P.Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 51(3), pp. 513--550, October 2018. Preliminary version published at AAAI-16. The paper is also available as an arXiv report.
    [SCW] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  51. Achieving Fully Proportional Representation by Clustering Voters, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, K. Stahl, N. Talmon, Journal of Heuristics, Vol. 24(5), pp. 725--756, October 2018. Initial version of the paper was presented at AAMAS-16.
    [J.HEUR] [AAMAS]

  52. Egalitarian Committee Scoring Rules, H. Aziz, P. Faliszewski, B. Grofman, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, IJCAI-ECAI-2018.
    [IJCAI-ECAI]

  53. Opinion Diffusion and Campaigning on Society Graphs, P. Faliszewski, R. Gonen, M. Koutecky, N. Talmon, IJCAI-ECAI-2018.
    [IJCAI-ECAI]

  54. Optimization-Based Voting Rule Design: The Closer to Utopia the Better, P. Faliszewski, S. Szufa, N. Talmon, AAMAS-2018. The paper was also presented at COMSOC-2018.
    [AAMAS] [COMSOC]

  55. Between Proportionality and Diversity: Balancing District Sizes under the Chamberlin–Courant Rule, P. Faliszewski, N. Talmon, AAMAS-2018.
    [AAMAS]

  56. Effective Heuristics for Committee Scoring Rules, P. Faliszewski, M. Lackner, D. Peters, N. Talmon, AAAI-2018. Early version of this paper was presnted at EXPLORE-2017 as E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, M. Lackner, D. Peters, N. Talmon, "Committee Scoring Rules, Banzhaf Values, and Approximation Algorithms"
    [AAAI] [EXPLORE]

  57. Multiwinner Elections with Diversity Constraints, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, A. Igarashi, M. Lackner, P. Skowron, AAAI-2018. The paper was presented at COMSOC-2018. Full version available as an arXiv technical report.
    [AAAI] [COMSOC] [arXiv]

  58. Chamberlin-Courant Rule with Approval Ballots: Approximating the MaxCover Problem with Bounded Frequencies in FPT Time, P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol. 60, pp. 687--716, 2017. Preliminary version of this paper appeared at the AAAI-2015 conferene, entitled Fully Proportional Representation with Approval Ballots: Approximating the MaxCover Problem with Bounded Frequencies in FPT Time. The paper is also available as an arXiv technical reprot arXiv:1309.4405.
    [JAIR] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  59. Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy, J. Chen, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, N. Talmon, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol 60, pp. 937--1002, 2017. Preliminary version published at AAAI-2015. Also available as arXiv:1411.7812 technical report
    [JAIR] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  60. Multiwinner Rules on Paths From k-Borda to Chamberlin-Courant, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, IJCAI-2017.
    [IJCAI]

  61. The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality, H. Aziz, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, M. Lackner, P. Skowron, IJCAI-2017.
    [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  62. Bribery as a Measure of Candidate Success: Complexity Results for Approval-Based Multiwinner Rules P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, N. Talmon, AAMAS-2017.
    [AAMAS]

  63. Two-Phase Strategy Managing Insensitivity in Global Optimization, J. Sawicki, M. Smołka, M. Łoś, R. Schaefer, P. Faliszewski, EvoApplications-2017.
    [EvoA]

  64. What Do Multiwinner Voting Rules Do? An Experiment Over the Two-Dimensional Euclidean Domain, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, J-F. Laslier, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, AAAI-17.
    Warning! The rule called PAV in the paper is in fact HarmonicBorda (it uses the Borda scoring function and not k-Approval, as mistakenly indicated.)
    [AAAI] [Full version]

  65. Properties of Multiwinner Voting Rules, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 48(3), pp. 599--632, 2017. Preliminary version of the paper was presented at AAMAS-2014.
    [SCW] [AAMAS]

  66. Multiwinner Voting in Genetic Algorithms, P. Faliszewski, J. Sawicki, R. Schaefer, M. Smołka, IEEE Intelligent Systems, Vol. 32(1), pp. 40--48. 2017. Preliminary version of this paper was presented at EvoApplications-2016 under title "Multiwinner Voting in Genetic Algorithms for Solving Ill-Posed Global Optimization Problems".
    [IEEE-IS] [EvoA]

  67. How Hard is Control in Single-Crossing Elections?, K. Magiera, P. Faliszewski, Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Vol. 31(3), pp. 606--627, 2017. Short version of this paper was presented at ECAI-2014.
    [JAAMAS] [ECAI]

  68. Campaign Management under Approval-Driven Voting Rules, I. Schlotter, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, Algorithmica. Vol. 77(1), pp. 84--115, 2017. Extended abstract of this paper was presented at AAAI-2011. Full version is available also as a technical report arXiv:1501:00387.
    [Algorithmica] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  69. Prices Matter for the Parameterized Complexity of Shift Bribery, R. Bredereck, J. Chen, P. Faliszewski, A. Nichterlein, R. Niedermeier, Information and Computation, Vol. 251, pp. 140--160, 2016. Extended abstract presented at AAAI-2014. Full version available as an arXiv:1502.01253 technical report.
    [I&C] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  70. Finding a Collective Set of Items: From Proportional Multirepresentation to Group Recommendation P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, J. Lang, Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 241, pp. 191--216, 2016. Extended abstract presented at AAAI-2015. Also available as COMSOC-2014 paper and as technical report arXiv:1402.3044
    [AIJ] [AAAI] [COMSOC] [arXiv]

  71. The Complexity of Priced Control in Elections, T. Miasko, P. Faliszewski, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 77(3-4), pp. 225--250, 2016.
    [AMAI]

  72. The Complexity of Voter Control and Shift Bribery Under Parliament Choosing Rules, T. Put, P. Faliszewski, Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence, Vol. 23, pp. 29--50, 2016.
    [TCCI]

  73. On the Computational Cost and Complexity of Stochastic Inverse Solvers, P. Faliszewski, M. Smolka, R. Schaefer, M. Paszynski, Computer Science Vol. 17(2), pp. 225-264, 2016.
    [CSC]

  74. Committee Scoring Rules, P. Faliszewski, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, COMSOC-16. This is a summary/survey of two other papers, "Committee Scoring Rules: Axiomatic Classification and Hierarchy" and "Multiwinner Analogues of the Plurality Rule: Axiomatic and Algorithmic Views"
    [COMSOC]

  75. Modeling Representation of Minorities Under Multiwinner Voting Rules, P. Faliszewski, J-F. Laslier, R. Schaefer, P. Skowron, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, arXiv technical report.
    [arXiv]

  76. How Hard Is It for a Party to Nominate an Election Winner?, P. Faliszewski, L. Gourves, J. Lang, J. Lesca, J. Monnot, IJCAI-16.
    [IJCAI]

  77. Voting-Based Group Formation, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, N. Talmon, IJCAI-16.
    [IJCAI]

  78. Large-Scale Election Campaigns: Combinatorial Shift Bribery, R. Bredereck, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, N. Talmon. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol. 55, pp. 603--652, 2016. Preliminary version of the paper was presented at AAMAS-15.
    [JAIR] [AAMAS]

  79. Weighted Electoral Control, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, Vol. 52, pp. 507--542, 2015. Preliminary version of the paper was presented at AAMAS 2013 (Best Paper Award runner up). Also available as arXiv:1305:0943 technical report.
    [JAIR] [AAMAS] [arXiv]

  80. Combinatorial Voter Control in Elections, L. Bulteau, J. Chen, P. Faliszewski, R. Niedermeier, N. Talmon, Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 589, pp. 99--120, 2015. Also appears as an arXiv technical report 1406.6859. Prerliminary version of the paper was presented at MFCS-2014.
    [TCS] [MFCS] [arXiv]

  81. Distance Rationalization of Voting Rule, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 45(2), pp. 345--377, 2015. This paper combines results from a number of previous publications that appeared in various forms and shapes (at conferences, workshops, as technical reports etc.). Below is the list of these papers:
    1. Distance Rationalization of Voting Rules, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, COMSOC-2010. [COMSOC]
    2. Homogeneity and Monotonicity of Distance-Rationalizable Voting Rules, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, AAMAS-2011. Full version of the paper is available as a here. [AAMAS] [TR]
    3. Good Rationalizations of Voting Rules, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, AAAI-2010. [AAAI]
    4. On the Role of Distances in Defining Voting Rules, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, AAMAS-2010. [AAMAS]
    5. On Distance Rationalizability of Some Voting Rules, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, TARK-09. [TARK]
    [SCW]

  82. Achieving Fully Proportional Representation: Approximability Results, P. Skowron, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 222, pp. 67--103, 2015. Technical Report arXiv:1312:4026. This paper combines and extends two papers by the same authors: (1) Fully Proportional Representation as Resource Allocation: Approximability Results (IJCAI-13, arXiv(1), also presented at CoopMAS-13 and M-PREF-12), and (2) Achieving Fully Proportional Representation is Easy in Practice (AAMAS-13, arXiv(2)).
    [AIJ] [arXiv] [IJCAI] [AAMAS] [CoopMAS] [M-PREF] [arXiv(1)] [arXiv(2)]

  83. The Complexity of Fully Proportional Representation for Single-Crossing Electorates, P. Skowron, L. Yu, P. Faliszewski, E. Elkind. Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 569, pp. 43--57, 2015. Early version of the paper was presented at SAGT-2013. Technical report version is available through arXiv:1307.1252.
    [TCS] [SAGT] [arXiv]

  84. The Complexity of Recognizing Incomplete Single-Crossing Preferences, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, M. Lackner, S. Obraztsova, AAAI-2015.
    [AAAI]

  85. Complexity of Manipulation, Bribery, and Campaign Management in Bucklin and Fallback Voting, P. Faliszewski, Y. Reisch, J. Rothe, L. Schend, Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, Vol 29(6), pp. 1091-1124, 2015. Also available as a technical report. Preliminary version appeared in AAMAS-2014 (short paper).
    [JAAMAS] [AAMAS] [arXiv]

  86. Recognizing 1-Euclidean Preferences: An Alternative Approach, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, SAGT-2014.
    [SAGT]

  87. Possible Winners in Noisy Elections, K. Wojtas, K. Magiera, T. Miasko, P. Faliszewski, Technical Report arXiv:1405.6630. An earlier versions presented at AAAI-2012 and at IJCAI Workshop on Social Choice and Artificial Intelligence (WSCAI-2011).
    [arXiv] [AAAI] [WSCAI]

  88. The Complexity of Manipulative Attacks in Nearly Single-Peaked Electorates, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 207, pp. 69--99. February 2014. Preliminary version presented at TARK-2011. Also available as URCS-TR-968.
    [AIJ] [TARK] [arXiv]

  89. The Complexity of Losing Voters, T. Perek, P. Faliszewski, M.S. Pini, F. Rossi, AAMAS-2013.
    [AAMAS]

  90. On swap distance geometry of voting rules, S. Obraztsova, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, AAMAS-2013.
    [AAMAS]

  91. Weighted Manipulation for Four-Candidate Llull is Easy, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, H. Schnoor, ECAI-2012.
    [ECAI]

  92. Clone Structures in Voters' Preferences, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, ACM EC-2012. Also available as arXiv:1110.3939 technical report.
    [EC] [arXiv] [TR]

  93. Campaigns for Lazy Voters: Truncated Ballots, D. Baumeister, P. Faliszewski, J. Lang, J. Rothe, AAMAS-2012.
    [AAMAS]

  94. Manipulating the Quota in Weighted Voting Games, M. Zuckerman, P. Faliszewski, Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, Artificial Intelligence, Vol. 180--181, pp. 1--19, April 2012. Also presented at AAAI-08.
    [AIJ] [AAAI]

  95. Cloning in Elections: Finding the Possible Winners, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, Journal of Artificial Intellligence Research, Vol. 42, pp. 529--573, 2011. Also presented at AAAI-2010, at the 10th International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare in Moscow, and at COMSOC-2010 with title "Cloning in Elections".
    [JAIR] [AAAI] [COMSOC]

  96. An NTU Cooperative Game Theoretic View of Manipulating Elections , M. Zuckerman, P. Faliszewski, V. Conitzer, J. Rosenschein, WINE-2011.
    [WINE]

  97. Rationalizations of Condorcet-Consistent Rules via Distances of Hamming Type, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, Social Choice & Welfare, Vol. 39(4), pp. 891--905, 2012. Also available as Technical Report.
    [SCW] [arXiv]

  98. Constrained Coalition Formation, T. Rahwan, T. Michalak, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, J. Sroka, M. Wooldridge, N. Jennings, AAAI-2011.
    [AAAI]

  99. Coalitional Voting Manipulation: A Game-Theoretic Perspective Y. Bachrach, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, IJCAI-2011. Also presented at CoopMAS 2011 workshop (colocated with AAMAS 2011).
    [IJCAI] [CoopMAS]

  100. The Shield that Never Was: Societies with Single-Peaked Preferences are More Open to Manipulation and Control, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe, Information and Computation, Vol. 209/2, pp. 89--107, February 2011. Also available as a technical report, arXiv:0909.3257 and URCS TR-950. Preliminary version presented at TARK-09.
    [I&C] [TARK] [arXiv]

  101. Multimode Control Attacks on Elections, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, Journal of AI Research, Vol. 40, pp. 305--351, 2011. Also available as URCS TR-960 and as arXiv Technical Report arXiv:1007.1800. Preliminary versions presented at IJCAI-09.
    [JAIR] [IJCAI] [arXiv]

  102. On the Autoreducibility of Functions, P. Faliszewski, M. Ogihara, Theory of Computing Systems, Vol. 46(2), pp. 222--245, 2010. Also available as URCS TR-912. Preliminary version presented at MFCS-05 (Separating the Notions of Self- and Autoreducibility, see also URCS TR-874).
    [ToCS] [MFCS-05] [TR]

  103. Approximation Algorithms for Campaign Management, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, WINE-2010. Full version of the paper is available as a Technical Report.
    [WINE] [arXiv]

  104. Probabilistic Possible Winner Determination, Y. Bachrach, N. Betzler, P. Faliszewski, AAAI-2010.
    [AAAI]

  105. Manipulation of Copeland Elections, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, H. Schnoor, AAMAS-2010.
    [AAMAS]

  106. Swap Bribery, E. Elkind, P. Faliszewski, A. Slinko, SAGT-09, 2009. Full version available as a technical report.
    [SAGT] [arXiv]

  107. Boolean Combinations of Weighted Voting Games, P. Faliszewski, E. Elkind, M. Wooldridge, AAMAS-09.
    [AAMAS]

  108. Llull and Copeland Voting Computationally Resist Bribery and Constructive Control, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, L. Hemaspaandra, J. Rothe, Journal of AI Research, Vol. 35, pp. 275-341, 2009. Full version of the paper is available as URCS TR-933. Results from this paper were presented in part at AAAI-07 (Llull and Copeland Voting Broadly Resist Bribery and Control, see also URCS TR-913) and at AAIM-08 (Copeland Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control, see also URCS TR-923)
    [JAIR] [AAIM] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  109. How Hard Is Bribery in Elections?, P. Faliszewski, L. Hemaspaandra, E. Hemaspaandra, Journal of AI Research, Vol. 35, pp. 485-532, 2009. Also available as URCS TR-895. Preliminary versions presented at AAAI-06 (The Complexity of Bribery in Elections) and COMSOC'06.
    [JAIR] [AAAI] [arXiv]

  110. The Complexity of Power-Index Comparison, P. Faliszewski, L. Hemaspaandra, Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 410(1), pp. 101--107, 2009. Also available as URCS TR-929. Preliminary version presented at AAIM-08.
    [TCS] [AAIM] [arXiv]

  111. Manipulation of Elections: Algorithms and Infeasibility Results, P. Faliszewski, Ph.D. thesis, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627. Also available as URCS-TR 941.
    [TR]

  112. Approximability of Manipulating Elections, E. Brelsford, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaadnra, I. Schnoor, and H. Schnoor, AAAI-08. Also presented at COMSOC.
    [AAAI] [COMSOC]

  113. The Consequences of Eliminating NP Solutions, P. Faliszewski, L. Hemaspaandra, Computer Science Review, Vol. 2(1), pp. 40--54, 2008. Also available as URCS TR-898
    [CSR] [arXiv]

  114. Copeland Voting: Ties Matter, P. Faliszewski, E. Hemaspaandra, and H. Schnoor, AAMAS-08. Also available as URCS TR-926
    [AAMAS] [TR]

  115. Nonuniform Bribery, P. Faliszewski, AAMAS-08. Also available as URCS TR-922.
    [AAMAS]

  116. Open Questions in the Theory of Semifeasible Computation, P. Faliszewski and L.A. Hemaspaandra, SIGACT News, Vol. 37, 2006. Also available as URCS TR-872.
    [SIGACT News] [arXiv]

  117. Advice for Semifeasible Sets and the Complexity-Theoretic Cost(lessness) of Algebraic Properties, P. Faliszewski and L.A. Hemaspaandra, International Journal of Foundations of Computer Science, 16(5), pp. 913--928, 2005. Also available as URCS TR-872.
    [IJFCS] [TR]

  118. Properties of Uniformly Hard Languages, P. Faliszewski and J. Jarosz, Information Processing Letters, Vol. 95/1, pp 329--332, 2005.
    [IPL]

  119. Exponential time reductions and sparse languages in NEXP, ECCC report 64, 2004.
    [ECCC]