|
|
|
Accepted Papers
Accepted papers will be collected in informal workshop notes,
printed copies of which will be available at the workshop.
The accepted papers are:
- How Many Vote Operations Are Needed to Manipulate A Voting System?
Lirong Xia
- Housing Markets with Indifferences: a Tale of Two Mechanisms
Haris Aziz, Bart de Keijzer
- The Complexity of Online Manipulation of Sequential Elections
Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe
- Manipulation Under Voting Rule Uncertainty
Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Elkind
- An Empirical Study of Voting Rules and Manipulation with Large Datasets
Nicholas Mattei, James Forshee, Judy Goldsmith
- The Price of Neutrality for the Ranked Pairs Method
Markus Brill, Felix Fischer
- Goodness of fit measures for revealed preference tests: Complexity results and algorithms
Bart Smeulders, Frits Spieksma, Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock
- The Possible Winner Problem with Uncertain Weights
Dorothea Baumeister, Magnus Roos, Jörg Rothe, Lena Schend, Lirong Xia
- Possible and Necessary Winners of Partial Tournaments
Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Jérôme Lang, Hans Georg Seedig
- Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries in Social Choice
Achill Schürmann
- Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games with Restricted Interaction
Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind, Jeffrey Rosenschein
- Graph Aggregation
Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi
- Analysis and Optimization of Multi-dimensional Percentile Mechanisms
Xin Sui, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm
- Computing Socially-Efficient Cake Divisions
Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb, Avinatan Hassidim
- Voting with Partial Information: Minimal Sets of Questions to Decide an Outcome
Ning Ding, Fangzhen Lin.
- College admissions with stable score-limits
Peter Biro, Sofya Kiselgof
- Bribery and Control in Judgment Aggregation
Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Olivia J. Erdélyi, Jörg Rothe
- Being caught between a rock and a hard place in an election–voter deterrence by deletion of candidates
Britta Dorn, Dominikus Krüger
- Aggregating Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences on Multi-Issue Domains
Jérôme Lang, Jérôme Mengin, Lirong Xia
- Empirical Aspects of Plurality Election Equilibria
David Thompson, Omer Lev, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Jeffrey Rosenschein
- On the Complexity of Voting Manipulation Under Randomized Tie-Breaking
Svetlana Obraztsova, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind
- Resistance to bribery when aggregating soft constraints
Alberto Amaran, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable
- The Complexity of Nearly Single-Peaked Consistency
Gábor Erdélyi, Martin Lackner, Andreas Pfandler
- Models of Manipulation on Aggregation of Binary Evaluations
Dvir Falik, Elad Dokow
- Complexity and Approximability of Social Welfare Optimization in Multiagent Resource Allocation
Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Trung Thanh Nguyen, Magnus Roos, Jörg Rothe
- Manipulating Two Stage Voting Rules
Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh
- Elicitation-free Protocols for Allocating Indivisble Goods
Thomas Kalinowski, Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia
- Online (Budgeted) Social Choice
Brendan Lucier, Joel Oren
- Cost-sharing of continuous knapsacks
Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler
- Group Activity Selection Problem
Andreas Darmann, Edith Elkind, Sascha Kurz, Jérôme Lang, Joachim Schauer, Gerhard Woeginger
- On Elections with Robust Winners
Dmitry Shiryaev, Lan Yu, Edith Elkind
- The common structure of paradoxes in aggregation theory
Umberto Grandi
- Robust Winners and Winner Determination Policies under Candidate Uncertainty
Craig Boutilier, Jérôme Lang, Joel Oren, Hector Palacios
- Implementation by Agenda Voting
Sean Horan
- Empathetic Social Choice on Social Networks
Amirali Salehi-Abari, Craig Boutilier
- Coordination via Polling in Plurality Voting Games under Inertia
Reyhaneh Reyhani, Mark Wilson, Javad Khazaei
- A characterization of the single-crossing domain
Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Gerhard Woeginger
- Bounded single-peaked width and proportional representation
Lucie Galand, Denis Cornaz, Olivier Spanjaard
|