Fourth International Workshop on Computational Social Choice
Kraków, Poland, September 11–13, 2012

Accepted Papers

Accepted papers will be collected in informal workshop notes, printed copies of which will be available at the workshop.

The accepted papers are:

  1. How Many Vote Operations Are Needed to Manipulate A Voting System?
    Lirong Xia
  2. Housing Markets with Indifferences: a Tale of Two Mechanisms
    Haris Aziz, Bart de Keijzer
  3. The Complexity of Online Manipulation of Sequential Elections
    Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe
  4. Manipulation Under Voting Rule Uncertainty
    Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Elkind
  5. An Empirical Study of Voting Rules and Manipulation with Large Datasets
    Nicholas Mattei, James Forshee, Judy Goldsmith
  6. The Price of Neutrality for the Ranked Pairs Method
    Markus Brill, Felix Fischer
  7. Goodness of fit measures for revealed preference tests: Complexity results and algorithms
    Bart Smeulders, Frits Spieksma, Laurens Cherchye, Bram De Rock
  8. The Possible Winner Problem with Uncertain Weights
    Dorothea Baumeister, Magnus Roos, Jörg Rothe, Lena Schend, Lirong Xia
  9. Possible and Necessary Winners of Partial Tournaments
    Haris Aziz, Markus Brill, Felix Fischer, Paul Harrenstein, Jérôme Lang, Hans Georg Seedig
  10. Exploiting Polyhedral Symmetries in Social Choice
    Achill Schürmann
  11. Bounding the Cost of Stability in Games with Restricted Interaction
    Reshef Meir, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind, Jeffrey Rosenschein
  12. Graph Aggregation
    Ulle Endriss, Umberto Grandi
  13. Analysis and Optimization of Multi-dimensional Percentile Mechanisms
    Xin Sui, Craig Boutilier, Tuomas Sandholm
  14. Computing Socially-Efficient Cake Divisions
    Yonatan Aumann, Yair Dombb, Avinatan Hassidim
  15. Voting with Partial Information: Minimal Sets of Questions to Decide an Outcome
    Ning Ding, Fangzhen Lin.
  16. College admissions with stable score-limits
    Peter Biro, Sofya Kiselgof
  17. Bribery and Control in Judgment Aggregation
    Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Olivia J. Erdélyi, Jörg Rothe
  18. Being caught between a rock and a hard place in an election–voter deterrence by deletion of candidates
    Britta Dorn, Dominikus Krüger
  19. Aggregating Conditionally Lexicographic Preferences on Multi-Issue Domains
    Jérôme Lang, Jérôme Mengin, Lirong Xia
  20. Empirical Aspects of Plurality Election Equilibria
    David Thompson, Omer Lev, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Jeffrey Rosenschein
  21. On the Complexity of Voting Manipulation Under Randomized Tie-Breaking
    Svetlana Obraztsova, Yair Zick, Edith Elkind
  22. Resistance to bribery when aggregating soft constraints
    Alberto Amaran, Maria Silvia Pini, Francesca Rossi, Kristen Brent Venable
  23. The Complexity of Nearly Single-Peaked Consistency
    Gábor Erdélyi, Martin Lackner, Andreas Pfandler
  24. Models of Manipulation on Aggregation of Binary Evaluations
    Dvir Falik, Elad Dokow
  25. Complexity and Approximability of Social Welfare Optimization in Multiagent Resource Allocation
    Nhan-Tam Nguyen, Trung Thanh Nguyen, Magnus Roos, Jörg Rothe
  26. Manipulating Two Stage Voting Rules
    Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh
  27. Elicitation-free Protocols for Allocating Indivisble Goods
    Thomas Kalinowski, Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia
  28. Online (Budgeted) Social Choice
    Brendan Lucier, Joel Oren
  29. Cost-sharing of continuous knapsacks
    Andreas Darmann, Christian Klamler
  30. Group Activity Selection Problem
    Andreas Darmann, Edith Elkind, Sascha Kurz, Jérôme Lang, Joachim Schauer, Gerhard Woeginger
  31. On Elections with Robust Winners
    Dmitry Shiryaev, Lan Yu, Edith Elkind
  32. The common structure of paradoxes in aggregation theory
    Umberto Grandi
  33. Robust Winners and Winner Determination Policies under Candidate Uncertainty
    Craig Boutilier, Jérôme Lang, Joel Oren, Hector Palacios
  34. Implementation by Agenda Voting
    Sean Horan
  35. Empathetic Social Choice on Social Networks
    Amirali Salehi-Abari, Craig Boutilier
  36. Coordination via Polling in Plurality Voting Games under Inertia
    Reyhaneh Reyhani, Mark Wilson, Javad Khazaei
  37. A characterization of the single-crossing domain
    Robert Bredereck, Jiehua Chen, Gerhard Woeginger
  38. Bounded single-peaked width and proportional representation
    Lucie Galand, Denis Cornaz, Olivier Spanjaard